Towards a Sustainable Macroeconomic Policy: A Primer on the Federal Deficit, Debt, and the Agricultural Economy by Tweeten, Luther G.
Towards A 
Sustainable 
Macroeconomic 
Policy: 
A Primer on the Federal Deficit, 
Debtt and the Agricultural Economy 
Luther Tweeten * 
"' Anderson ProfeS$or of Agricultural 
Policy* Marketing, and Trade~ Department 
of Agricultural Economics: and Rural 
Sociulogy t 1'he Ohio State University, 
Columbus, AERS Distinguished Faculty 
Lecture,. April 8, 1993. Comments of Bill 
Bu.cke.lt Mike Hurley, Ralph Mo.daco~ ··and 
Carl Zulauf are ~appreciated. The autho:r 
is S¢1ety·· responsible for sh0rte6lnings. 
:ESO 2®~ 
Executive Summary 
policy: 
xcessive public and private 
debt lays strong claim to 
being the nation's foremost 
economic problem. This 
report answers key 
questions regarding fiscal 
1. How large is the federal budget 
deficit and debt? 
2. How do budget deficits and debt 
affect the economy? 
3. What is the impact of the federal 
deficit and debt on agriculture? 
4. What are the limits to federal 
debt? 
5. What must be done to restore 
fiscal responsibility? 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Size of the Deficit 
A federal deficit of over $300 billion is 
expected in fiscal 1993. The extent of the 
federal government's attempt to live 
beyond its means may be more fully 
measured by additions to federal debt. 
By this measure, fiscal shortfalls have 
averaged 35% higher than indicated by 
the federal deficit. If debt continues to 
accumulate at the 1980-92 rate (it can-
not), interest on debt would consume the 
entire gross domestic product in 41 years. 
A financial crisis characterized by a run 
on the dollar will come much sooner if 
current fiscal policies are not changed. 
Debt buildup could cause technical 
bankruptcy apparent when attempts to 
reduce the deficit would slow the 
economy and actually increase the deficit. 
As of this writing the success of the 
Clinton Administration and Congress in 
restoring fiscal discipline was not at all clear. Continuation of 1980-92 policies for another 
four years could make a return to fiscal responsibility traumatic indeed. On the other hand, 
return to a balanced federal budget in one year also would massively assault the economy. 
To reduce shock, the adjustment to fiscal responsibility needs to be spread over a 5-10 year 
period . 
••••••••••••••• 
Impact on the Economy 
Interest on the debt is fast becoming the largest item in the federal budget and soon will 
exceed the federal deficit, implying that the current generation of government service 
beneficiaries (except creditors) are not benefitting from deficits. Taxpayers will be paying 
out more than the government's beneficiaries (except creditors) will receive in goods and 
services. Federal deficits redistribute income to the current generation from future 
generations, cause economic instability and dislocation of people and businesses, retard 
economic growth, and slowly sacrifice foreign policy and macroeconomic policy decisions to 
foreign creditors. 
Continuation of large full-employment federal deficits will restrain economic growth more in 
the 1990s than in the 1980s. As the economy recovers, private investment will require a 
growing share of private saving. Competition for available domestic saving will raise interest 
rates to attract fmancing from abroad but the international response is likely to be 
disappointing. This will slow U.S. investment and economic recovery. 
Some economists claimed that large federal deficits following the recession of 1981-82 
would absorb individual and corporate saving, drive up interest rates, crowd out investment, 
and truncate the recovery. That didn't occur because foreign fmancial capital was available. 
In the 1990s, a recovery may indeed be slowed by deficits because international funds will 
be less available to make up for lack of private savings. The stock market decline and 
economy slowdown in Japan and Germany limit the foreign supply of fmancial capital 
available to America. America in the 1990s is a less attractive place to invest than in the 
1980s because of huge debt and demonstrated lack of fiscal discipline. · 
••••••••••••••• 
Impact on Agriculture 
Farmers are hurt by the cash flow, real wealth, instability, dislocation, and cost-price 
squeeze impacts of federal deficits. From 1982 to 1986, the farming economy suffered 
financial stress from high real interest and exchange rates and low exports and commodity 
prices caused by full-employment deficits. Consumers benefitted in that expansionary phase 
of the fiscal cycle from cheap imports and high consumption possible when a nation lives 
beyond its means. The position of traded goods sectors such as agriculture and consumers 
is reversed in the stabilization phase as the nation stops borrowing more than it lends, 
consuming more than it produces, investing more than it saves, and importing more than it 
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exports. Gains in the stabilization phase may offset losses in the expansionary phase, but 
agriculture is a net loser because of the inefficiency and trauma of instability. Agriculture 
has a huge stake in sound macroeconomic policies . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Restoring Fiscal Responsibility 
The adjustment to a sound economy will be difficult but not impossible. The reason is 
because the deficit is mostly a transfer payment. Increased government spending and 
reduced taxes have been financed by borrowing. Every dollar added to the economy 
through government deficit spending has been offset by a dollar removed from creditors' 
spending for consumption or investment. Similarly, one less dollar of government deficit 
spending will leave another dollar in the hands of creditors to spend on consumption or 
investment. Hence presence or absence of deficits kept within reasonable bounds and 
financed by borrowing does not have a decisive influence on aggregate demand. Foreign-
held debt behaves differently because repayments are less likely to be spent in the U.S. 
where they help to sustain aggregate demand. 
This report could have but did not focus on specific tax and spending changes. For 
example, introducing a value added tax, reducing payroll taxes, and removing the corporate 
income tax could encourage saving and investment; indexing capital gains, limiting home 
mortgage income tax deductions, and extending the school year to 10 months could raise 
investments in human, material, and technological capital. Raising gasoline taxes by at least 
50 cents per gallon could reduce traffic congestion and dependence on foreign oil while 
encouraging energy efficiency and protection of the environment. Expanded apprenticeship 
programs, a wage supplement, or enlarged earned income credit could help disadvantaged 
workers escape poverty. All retirement programs (including Social Security) could be 
converted to actuarially sound vested investment plans to increase savings. The list could 
go on but is controversial and hence would require years to pass and implement. Thus the 
focus must first be on fiscal responsibility. 
The principal cause of federal fiscal incontinence has been the decline of encompassing 
institutions such as political parties. To restore discipline, these institutions must be 
strengthened. This report details other institutional changes needed to regain control of the 
federal budget. 
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Towards a Sustainable Macroeconomic Policy: 
A Primer on the Federal Deficit, Debt, 
and the Agricultural Economy 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
resident Clinton's economic program cuts federal outlays for agriculture more 
than any sector except defense. This is another in a series of setbacks for 
agriculture stemming from the nation's troubled macroeconomic policy, the 
major source of shocks to the farming economy in the past two decades. In 
the 1970s, farm cash-flow problems of inflation arose from overexpansion of 
the nation's money supply. Recession to "whip inflation now" (WIN) followed 
by the Reaganomics of full-employment budget deficits created the traumatic financial stress 
years of 1982 to 1986. 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 was a cause of lower 
loan rates and a freeze on target prices in the 1985 farm bill. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 designed to restore fiscal integrity made deep cuts in the 1990 
farm bill and was the proximate cause of the 1990-91 recession which cost many farmers 
their off-farm jobs. Excessive public and private debt has a strong claim to being the 
nation's foremost economic problem and was the root cause of the 1990-91 recession. 
The objective of this paper is to explain causes, consequences, and cures for the nation's 
fiscal policy dilemma. Key questions to be answered include: 
1. How large is the federal budget deficit and debt? 
2. How do budget deficits and debt affect the economy? 
3. What is the impact of the federal deficit and debt on agriculture? 
4. What are the limits to federal debt? 
5. What must be done to restore fiScal responsibility? 
Because laypersons and economists alike lack information on basic issues of 
macroeconomic policies, considerable attention is given to details in this report. The 
numbers used herein are continually being revised by federal statistical agencies and are less 
important than the principles illustrated. Before examining numbers, however, it is critical 
to address the issue of whether fiscal policy is a problem -- some economists contend it is 
not. 
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••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IS THERE A BREAKDOWN IN 
THE MACROECONOMYOR IN MACROECONOl\fiSTS? 
The federal government has incurred deficits every year since 1960. Some argue that debt 
accumulation in the 1980s was simply business as usual, but that is incorrect. The deficits 
were sufficiently restrained to reduce federal debt from 57% of GNP in 1961 to 33% in 
1981, the lowest percentage in the post-World War II era. In sharp contrast, the percentage 
more than doubled to 70% of GNP by 1991. Thus debt accumulation at the 1981-91 rate 
is unsustainable in contrast to a sustainable rate prior to the 1980s. 
Economists have understated the seriousness of federal debt in part because they are of 
two minds or schools of thought on the issue. The first school holds that deficits per se are 
unimportant; at issue is how the public through the political process chooses to tax and 
spend over time. The political system is presumed to be a true revealed preference of a 
sovereign and democratic political economy. If deficits accrue in a full-employment 
economy, it is because society prefers that outcome. The reason for the deficit may be 
because society chose to invest in military and other capital while deferring payment to later 
--it is not the role of economists to question the voters' motives. This school argues that 
the political process gives society the fiscal policy it wants and deserves. 
The second school of thought, to which I subscribe, holds that full-employment budget 
deficits from 1983 to 1990 were the result of government failure in a flawed political system. 
The case for this second school is compelling. To the best of my knowledge, no Washington 
politician justifies the 1983-90 fiscal policy. Most strongly condemn it. Charges of blame 
and counterblame bounce back and forth between the Administration and Congress; 
between Democrats and Republicans. 
It would be difficult to confuse this political chaos with a well-functioning government. 
Unlike the invisible hand of the market turning private greed into public good, the political 
system turns good intentions of individuals into collective fiscal irresponsibility. But this 
explanation begs the question of why government has lost control of the budget only since 
1980. 
A deficit is justified to promote economic efficiency and hence real output if it is used to 
(1) stimulate aggregate demand in a depressed economy, a policy called Keynesian 
economics, or (2) for investments in human, material, and technological capital supplying 
goods and services that over time will cover the interest and principal and leave a social 
dividend. 
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Reaganomics, defmed as the neoKeynesian economics of large federal deficits in a full 
employment economy, clearly failed criterion (1) above. 1 Regarding criterion (2), some 
contend that the defense buildup under Reaganomics was a sound investment in national 
security that caused the demise of the Soviet Union. That demise, saving billions of military 
defense outlays in future years, meets criterion (2) above by providing a payoff more than 
covering the investment in the defense buildup. 
Other analysts hotly dispute that conclusion. They contend that collapse of the Soviet 
Union was inevitable not because of the Reagan defense buildup but because the political-
economic system was fatally flawed and unworkable. It collapsed from its own weight. Our 
military pressure was sufficient without the Reagan buildup. Reasonable people will 
continue to disagree on that issue. The fact is that if the defense buildup justified deficits 
in the 1980s, the dividend from such "investment" should justify surpluses in the 1990s. The 
federal budget continues to be out of control despite an end to the cold war. 
One reason why deficits persist and why the political system has served the nation poorly 
is because economists of all political leanings have poorly informed the process. 
Conservative economists such as Herbert Stein and monetarist Allan Meltzer hold that 
worthwhile spending should be pursued regardless of the government's ability to pay, that 
deficit reductions carry no urgency, and that holding down taxes is more important than 
balancing the budget. Some conservative economists have reasoned that private individuals 
and firms increase their savings as they observe government dissavings so as to countervail 
government actions and preserve private consumption streams over time. This rational 
expectations application to deficit spending, called the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis, 
strains credulity and is not supported by the data. 
Liberal economists such as Robert Eisner also maintain that worthwhile social program 
spending takes precedence over fiscal responsibility. In a mass breach of professional ethics, 
some 500 economists endorsed candidate Bill Clinton's economic program during the 1992 
presidential campaign. That program promised vast new spending for universal health 
insurance, expansion in training and schooling, infrastructure improvements, tax cuts to spur 
investment, and a halving of the deficit. All this was to be paid for by cuts in defense 
spending and a modest increase in taxes only on the rich. Balances in the "cooked" numbers 
were off by well over $100 billion. Economists knew it; most of the public probably did not. 
The public expects Presidential candidates to dissemble; economists need to encourage 
candor rather than concealment. Politicians do not believe they can be elected by telling 
the truth in part because economists have not been straightforward with the public. 
1Reaganomics should not be confused with supply side economics. Reaganomics included some desirable 
inducements for economic efficiency such as reduced taxes and public expenditures and moves to a more uniform 
and hence neutral taxes among resources. But the overarching feature of Reaganomics was latge full-
employment federal deficits. 
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An analogy for fiscal policy from 1983 to 1990 is the family headed for bankruptcy. The 
husband (Republicans) complains that the wife (Democrats) spends to much; the wife 
complains that the husband earns too little. Their children (the public) only know they are 
living well now; they are unaware they will be destitute when the money runs out. 
The foregoing discussion reinforces the case for the political system failure rather than 
the revealed preference explanation of America's unsustainable macroeconomic policies. 
A later section will examine in more depth why the fiscal system has failed and what can 
be done about it. Before turning to that issue, however, it is useful to understand the size 
and characteristics of the deficit and debt . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
HOW LARGE IS THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT AND DEBT? 
The size of the fiscal imbalance is measured first by the deficit, then the debt, and finally 
by projections of each . 
••••••••••••••• 
1he Deficit 
The size of the budget deficit like the size of an elephant can be measured in various 
ways, depending on the pmpose of the measurement. Of interest is the impact of the deficit 
on the economy (aggregate demand), the extent of traditional public services purchased now 
to be paid for later, and the tax hike necessary to eliminate the deficit. Adjustments are 
needed for transitory or cyclical components of the budget in projecting the deficit to the 
future. 
Definitions of the deficit are illustrated using 1991 numbers. Most widely quoted is the 
consolidated budget deficit comprised of government total receipts ($1,054 billion) less total 
outlays ($1,323 billion), or $269 billion (see Table 1). 
The consolidated deficit is comprised of two main components: (1) a deficit of $321 
billion on so called "on-budget" items such as defense and farm programs financed mainly 
by excise and income taxes and (2) a surplus of $52 billion on so called "off-budget" items 
(trust funds such as Social Security financed by payroll taxes, plus the Post Office). 
At issue is whether to focus on the consolidated deficit or the on-budget deficit. If the 
objective is to measure the federal fiscal stimulus to the economy, the consolidated deficit 
is more useful because the surplus in trust funds is offsetting fiscal stimulus to aggregate 
demand from the deficit in on-budget items. A more accurate fiscal stimulus deficit is the 
consolidated deficit ($269 billion) less the state and local government surpluses of $30 
billion for a total of $239 billion in 1991. 
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Table 1. Federal Debt, Debt Increase, and Budget Deficit for Fiscal 1980 to 1992. 
Year Federal Debt Debt Increase Consolidated Budget Deficit 
($ Billion) ($ Billion) ($ Billion) (% of Debt 
Increase) 
1980 909 81 74 91 
1981 994 85 79 93 
1982 1,137 143 128 90 
1983 1,371 234 208 89 
1984 1,564 193 185 96 
1985 1,817 253 212 84 
1986 2,120 303 221 73 
1987 2,346 226 150 66 
1988 2,601 255 155 61 
1989 2,868 267 153 57 
1990 3,206 338 220 65 
1991 3,599 393 269 68 
1992 4,003 404 290 72 
1993a 4,410 407 322 79 
Source: U.S. Council of Econom.1c Advisors, pp . 386,387. 
• Estimated. 
If the desire is to measure the magnitude of income tax and conventional spending 
adjustments needed for fiscal responsibility, the on-budget deficit is useful. The surplus in 
Social Security is omitted because it is essential for building a reserve to finance retirement 
of the baby boom generation after year 2010 without a large increase in payroll tax rates or 
cut in benefits at that time.2 A payroll tax decrease today as proposed by Senator Patrick 
Moynihan would reduce the payroll burden on the present generation at substantial expense 
to future payroll taxpayers or benefit recipients. 3 
2At the end offiscal1993,the federal government owed trust funds $1.1trillion. Largest holdings were the 
Social Security Old-Age and Survivors plus the disability trust funds totalling $382 billion, the hospital insurance 
fund totalling $144 billion, and the military retirement fund totalling $105 billion. Those who depend on these 
trust funds for medical care and retirement rightly fear that the government will not repay the entire borrowed 
principal and accrued interest. 
Proposals have been made to tax or otherwise reduce Social Security payments to wealthy recipients. This 
proposal may be justified on equity grounds to reduce payroll taxes on low paid workers but will not reduce the 
on-budget current operating account deficit. 
3The government is required to invest trust fund surpluses in Treasury bonds. While helping to fmance the 
federal debt, these bonds earn interest to fund future recipients of trust funds. 
It is well to consider what is the appropriate use of Social Security surpluses which must be accrued today 
to avoid sharply higher payroll taxes after year 2010. The answer is to invest the funds in high-payoff science, 
education, infrastructure, and industry which make the economy stronger. Buying power is not preserved for 
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The distinction between nominal and real debt suggests another correction in the size of 
the deficit. Adjusted to 1991 prices by the GDP implicit price deflator, debt increased "only" 
$252 billion in real terms rather than $393 billion in nominal terms between FY 1990 and 
1991. In other words, inflation in FY 1991 took $141 billion off the real value of the 
national debt. Thus the real consolidated deficit was $269 - $141 billion or $128 billion in 
1991.4 
The primary deficit measures the increase in future liabilities excluding those carried from 
the past. Interest on the debt and reimbursement of savings and loan bank deposit 
insurance are outlays for liabilities inherited from previous years. These are not new 
obligations incurred in the current year and hence are not current purchases of traditional 
goods and services by the government in excess of revenues. The primary deficit in 1991 
was 
Less: 
Less: 
Equals: 
Consolidated deficit 
Net interest on debtt 
Deposit insurance bailout 
Primary deficit 
($ Billion) 
269 
195 
66 
8. 
• Excludes $69 billion of interest on borrowing from trust funds. Total interest was $261 billion. 
Thus the widely reported "interest on the debt" substantially underestimates the actual interest 
expense -- if the trust funds are properly compensated some day. 
The implication is that the federal government in 1991 was spending a modest $8 billion 
more than its revenues to provide health, welfare, military, and other traditional 
consumption and investment. Thus the lion's share of the current deficit is the result of the 
nation living beyond its means in the past. The small primary deficit helps to explain why 
the nation's traditional service clientele does not feel much benefit from large current 
deficits. 
future generations if government deficits finance consumption rather than productive investment. Savings are 
fungible, however. If surplus social security funds were invested in corporate stocks instead of the deficit, the 
result would be only to draw other savings to finance the deficit for no net change in the economy. 
4The above calculation is useful in showing how debt increasing at the inflation rate does not increase real 
interest payment burden on GDP but is capable of much mischief. Such thinking has been a factor causing some 
countries to induce inflation to reduce debt burden. Such solutions to transfer real income from the public 
creditors to government works only if the interest rate is fixed and does not contain the inflation premium 
because inflation was not anticipated. Anticipated inflation is contained in interest rates, hence inflation does 
not save the government money. Even a government that surprises fixed-interest rate debt holders by inflating 
price or repudiating debt is likely to get no free lunch because it is cutting off future opportunities to borrow 
on reasonable terms. 
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Stated another way, a $261 billion deficit was needed in 1991 just to hold the same level 
of traditional government services as would have been afforded with no past deficits or S 
and L rescue. If $69 billion interest on borrowed trust funds would have been paid, 
traditional services would need to have been cut in 1991 despite the $269 billion deficit.5 
Soon, the primary deficit will be negative, meaning that less conventional government goods 
and services will be provided than if there had never been a deficit, other things equal. 
The fact that the nation currently is not incurring a budget deficit to serve immediate 
consumption is of little comfort, however: obligations incurred in the past must be serviced. 
Government deficits accrue interest burdens requiring more and more taxes just to maintain 
a given level of conventional public services. 
Most economists agree that government deficits need to act as a shock absorber and 
automatic stabilizer. That is, in a recession total taxes (but not tax rates) fall and outlays 
for federal programs such as unemployment compensation rise to cause a budget deficit, 
stimulating aggregate demand. As the economy recovers, tax revenues rise and outlays for 
safety net social services fall, presumably moving the federal budget into balance or surplus. 
Revenues and expenditures must be stripped of transitory elements to determine 
permanent tax increases or expenditure cuts needed to eliminate the deficit in a full 
employment economy. The normalized or structural deficit, cyclically adjusted, for 1991 is 
as follows: 
Minus: 
Minus: 
Plus: 
Plus: 
Equals: 
Consolidated deficit 
Deposit insurance 
Business cycle 
Trust fund borrowing (interest & principal) 
Desert Storm net reimbursements 
Structural deficit 
($ Billion) 
269 
66 
55 
123 
43 
314 
The recession and deposit insurance payments made the consolidated deficit larger than 
it would have been in more normal times (see Table 2). On the other hand, reimburse-
ments from other countries for Desert Storm expenses (incurred earlier) and borrowing from 
trust funds (plus failure to pay interest on what is borrowed) make the deficit look smaller 
than normal. Correction for transitory elements leaves a full-employment structural deficit 
5The Clinton Administration has proposed to shift financing from intermediate-term Treasury bonds to 
short-term bills at about half the interest rate to reduce interest payments. One advantage of short-term 
financing of the debt with costs that fluctuate with the inflation rate is less incentive for the government to 
expand money supply to reduce the real interest cost of debt financing. Short-term financing also has drawbacks. 
Locking into fixed long-term rates insures against higher future interest costs ifinflation and interest rates soar. 
Markets do a pretty good job of adjusting interest rates over time for relative short and long term risks, hence 
the expected future real cost of debt probably is not much different whether financed short or long term. 
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of $314 billion. This structural deficit was one-third of 1991 on-budget receipts of $760 
billion. 
Table 2. Projected Transitory Elements in the Federal Budget, Billion Dollars. 
Deposit Desert Storm Borrowing from 
Year Insurance Payments Trust Funds Business Cycle 
1991 66 43 54 55 
1992 13 5 51 75 
1993 49 0 58 59 
1994 17 0 67 37 
1995 5 0 77 27 
1996 -7a 0 86 21 
1997 -16 0 94 16 
Source: Con essional Bud et Office. gr g 
• Sale of properties are predicted to turn federal payments to net receipts in 1996 and 1997. 
In the above calculation, I assume that on-budget receipts normally need to equal 
expenditures, hence a balanced budget will have a surplus consolidated budget including 
trust funds. That approach makes sense for fiscal responsibility, but it can cause dislocations 
associated with tight fiscal policy. For that reason most other economists compute the 
structural deficit as a normal consolidated deficit -- including trust fund surpluses. 
Further perspective on the relative magnitude of a $314 billion structural deficit is 
apparent from on-budget operating fund tax receipts by source in 1991: 
Individual income taxes 
Corporate income taxes 
Excise taxes 
Estate taxes 
Customs fees and duties 
Earnings of Federal Reserve System 
Other (mainly on-budget social 
insurance) 
Total 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, p. 387. 
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Receipts 
($ Billion) 
468 
98 
42 
11 
16 
19 
106 
760 
Increase Needed to 
Balance Budget 
(Percent) 
67 
320 
748 
Large 
Large 
Large 
296 
41 
The structural deficit could be closed by raising individual income taxes 67%, or by raising 
all taxes 41 %. 6 These numbers suggest that the federal budget will not be balanced by an 
increase in taxes from traditional sources. A major new tax source may be needed such as 
the value added tax (VAT) 7 widely used in Western Europe and in Canada. 
Despite sizable changes in tax rates, federal receipts have averaged nearly 20% of GDP 
for four decades. This suggests that the current tax structure may not have much potential 
for expansion. Thus a new structure emphasizing the VAT has much appeal (see footnote 
7). 
An alternative is to reduce expenditures alone or in combination with a tax increase to 
remove the deficit. Itemized on-budget expenditures (like receipts above, uncorrected for 
cyclical and transitory elements) are shown for 1991 and compared to the structural deficit 
of $314 billion: 
National defense 
International affairs, science, technology, 
space, energy, natural resources and 
environment, agriculture, commerce, 
housing, veterans, justice, and general 
government 
Interest (On-budget only) 
Total 
Operating 
Expenditures 
($ Billion) 
273 
238 
215 
726 
Decrease Needed to 
Balance Budget 
(Percent) 
Large 
Large 
Large 
57 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, p. 387. Excludes Medicare and other components of Social Security. 
The normalized deficit cannot be closed by reducing national defense alone; interest alone; 
or all other expenditures such as science, education, and agriculture alone. All expenditures 
would need to be reduced by 57%. 
6These and later calculations assume unrealistically that tax and expenditure adjustments do not change the 
economy. In fact, tax increases would need to be larger than indicated because a given increase would slow the 
economy, creating a need for more taxes to eliminate a deficit. 
7The VAT taxes value added at each stage of the market. It taxes consumption rather than investment, 
hence does not retard the economy as much as most other taxes but is regressive. It is relatively easy to enforce 
because each stage has a self interest in fully reporting its costs which are receipts of the lower stage. Liberal 
politicians like the VAT because it is opaque and hence can be raised without much protest from taxpayers. 
Conservatives dislike the VAT for that same reason. Each percentage point of VAT would bring an estimated 
$25 billion, or more than President Clinton's income tax hike for the wealthy. A 4% VAT could replace the 
federal corporate income tax. The tax would need to be 5% to cover administrative cost. 
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••••••••••••••• 
The Debt 
Deficits are of concern because they add to the federal debt which must be serviced. That 
service may be in perpetuity because the debt is unlikely to be repaid. In addition to 
financing the budget deficit, the government borrows to make loans and guarantees 
constituting a contingent liability. The increase in the debt of $393 billion in FY 1991 may 
be a better measure than the budget deficit of additional future fiscal burden (Table 1). 
If the borrower defaults or if a bank (covered by deposit insurance) fails, the taxpayers 
must assume the liability as in the case of savings and loan bank deposit insurance. The 
savings and loan deposits constitute the largest federal liability shifted to taxpayers, but 
agriculture is also a significant source. Billions of dollars of liabilities were shifted to 
taxpayers on Farmers Home Administration direct and guaranteed loans in the 1980s. 
Former Soviet Union countries are defaulting on billions of dollars of GSM loans 
guaranteed on export sales made by private American firms. The federal government 
guarantees billions of dollars of private pension funds and loans which will be serviced by 
taxpayers in case of default. 
Table 1 data show that budget deficits consistently underestimated the liability imposed 
on the future. From 1980 to 1992, the consolidated budget deficit averaged 74% of debt 
increases. The differences between deficits and debt increments became larger in recent 
years. A sharp rise in defaults on federal direct or guaranteed loans and on insured bank 
deposits and pension plans could bring much larger future federal debt than anticipated. 
Federal debt was over four times larger in nominal terms in 1992 than in 1980. In net, 
tlrree times as much debt was acquired in 12 years than in the previous two centuries! In 
real terms, federal debt was 2.7 times larger in 1992 than in 1980. Debt averages nearly 
$17,000for each person and $77,000per family in the nation. With federal debt at 70% of 
GDP in 1991, the U.S. set a torrid pace but was not the world's record holder. In the 
European Community alone, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Greece ranked higher . 
••••••••••••••• 
Outlook 
In the absence of 1993 reforms (not including health insurance) by President Clinton, the 
consolidated deficit is projected to decline from $290 billion in 1992 to $212 billion in 1996 
(Figure 1). With reforms proposed by President Clinton, the deficit is projected to decline 
to $188 billion in 1996. Deficits are expected to grow again by 1997 under either scenario 
in Figure 1. 
The federal debt rising no faster than national income becomes no more relative burden 
to the economy. Assuming the economy grows 5.5% annually (2.5% real plus 3% inflation), 
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a $200 billion annual deficit and addition to debt could be tolerated without a growing 
relative financial burden. 
The Clinton Admini-
stration's proposal would 
reduce the deficit below 
$200 billion in fiscal 1996 
and 1997, but skepticism 
is in order. The Presi-
dent's program may not 
be enacted. Projections 
may be faulty. The 
economy may grow more 
$Billion 
350.0 r---------------------. 
300.0 
250.0 
200.0 
slowly than expected. 150.0 
Ambitious new health 
and other programs may 
add to expenditures 
without a corresponding 
increase in receipts. A 
better measure of the 
fiscal shortfall may be the 
projected increase in 
debt, which has averaged 
35% higher than deficits 
(see Table 1). 
100.0 
50.0 
0.0 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Figure 1. Consolidated Budget Deficit Projections. 
Source: President of the United States, p. 2. 
1998 
If the historic debt pattern shown in Table 1 continues, debt would increase $254 billion 
in FY 1996 and $245 billion in FY 1997 under Clinton's deficit projections of Figure 1. 
Reducing this debt increment to a sustainable $200 billion in 1996 would require a deficit 
reduction of $42.3 billion compared to the $23.9 billion reduction proposed by President 
Clinton. By this calculation, the Clinton economic plan even in the highly unlikely case that 
it is fully implemented and behaves as predicted will fall short of reaching a sustainable debt 
growth level by 1996. If history is repeated, fiscal reforms proposed by President Clinton 
will fail and that the federal deficit will be larger in 1996 than it was in 1992. Also if history 
is a guide, the national debt will be a larger proportion of the GDP in 1996 than it was in 
1992. 
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•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
HOW DO DEFICITS AFFECT THE ECONOMY? 
Federal deficits influence economic efficiency and the real economy but are mostly 
income transfers raising issues of equity among people and over time. 8 The impact of the 
deficit on the economy, economic efficiency, and equity depends on what funds are used for, 
how debt is financed, who holds debt, the state of the economy, and the length of run . 
••••••••••••••• 
Use of the Deficit 
As indicated earlier, deficits are justified to (1) stimulate aggregate demand during 
recession to put the economy to work, and (2) invest in durable human, material, and 
technological capital for long-term economic growth. A broad rule is that a deficit improves 
the economy if it provides discounted benefits in excess of costs. That means it must not 
only raise investment but that investment must have as high or higher payoff than and 
complement rather than displace that in the private sector. 
Public and private debt 
reached historic highs 
relative to GNP before 
each of the major 
economic downturns in 
this century (Figure 2). 
Accumulation of excessive 
private debt was a key 
element behind the 
recession of 1990-91, 
playing a role similar to 
excessive inventory 
accumulation in previous 
recessions. Excessive 
federal debt prolonged 
the recession because it 
restricted the scope for 
stimulative fiscal policy to 
move the economy 
quickly out of recession 
Percent 
140~--------------------------------------. 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1940 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 
Figure 2. Federal Debt as Percent of GNP. 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistics. 
- -
8 Economic efficiency, how well resources are allocated, determines the size of the "pie" of real goods and 
services in the economy. Economic equity, how that pie is divided among people and over time, also influences 
well-being of people. The real economy is goods and services available to satisfy wants of people; transfers are 
shifts of buying power among individuals and over time which may or may not influence the real economy. 
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(Figure 3). If the economy had not run large deficits from 1984 to 1990, large primary 
deficits of $269 billion in 1991 and $290 billion in 1992 would have ignited the economy. 
Private debt as a pro-
portion of the nation's 
income is being worked 
down and hence appears 
to be tractable. Mean-
while, public debt, most 
notably federal debt, 
continues to mount both 
in total and as a 
proportion of national 
income (Figure 3). 
The real impacts on the 
economy in foregone real 
goods and services may 
be quite different than 
costs or deficits borne by 
government. In the case 
of the savings and loan 
bank insured deposit 
debacle, the economy 
Percent 
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Figure 3. Public and Private Debt as Percent of GNP. 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistics. 
overexpanded because of investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, the 
oil boom, and other factors. The real cost to the economy was building of unneeded houses 
and office buildings. Defaults on loans to acquire such property caused bank failures and 
financial losses passed by the private sector to the government. The over-built real estate 
was the real cost; who ended up paying the cost was an issue in transfer payments. Special 
interests pressure the government to socialize losses and privatize gains. Unfortunately, such 
pressures have often succeeded. The result is economic inefficiency from excessive risk 
taking by a private sector aware that losses can be passed to the government and taxpayers. 9 
9The ideal tax system is neutral, not favoring capital over labor or debt capital over equity capital. The 
investment tax credit (which some propose to revive) favors capital over labor, inviting overinvestment in 
buildings and equipment. Meanwhile, the government proposes to raise taxes on labor to fmance apprenticeship 
training, health insurance, and other measures. A wiser course would be to reduce payroll taxes and eliminate 
corporate taxes with their double taxation of profits which encourages excessive debt versus equity financing. 
A value-added tax is an alternative. 
The ability to deduct interest cost of debt capital but not the dividend cost of equity capital from expenses 
causes excessive expansion of debt -- a major source of recession noted in this report. Having a neutral tax 
system would require the same tax rate on ordinary income and capital gains after the latter are adjusted 
(indexed) for inflation. 
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••••••••••••••• 
Method of Financing 
The method of fmancing a deficit influences the economy. A federal spending increase 
can be financed by taxes, borrowing, or printing money. 
1. Printing Money. Governments able to create money are sorely tempted to print 
money to finance deficit spending after exhausting their taxing and borrowing power. 
For some countries, domestically held debt has become too large to finance by taxes 
(without sending the economy into a recession that increases deficits) and exports will 
not service foreign held debt without sacrificing essential imports such as petroleum. 
A country is technically bankrupt when an attempt to reduce a deficit and debt causes 
them to increase. Increasing taxes and decreasing spending reduce aggregate demand. 
With a deteriorating economy, there is little recourse but tq default on debt or print 
money. Monetary expansion causes inflation when real output of goods and services 
does not keep pace with the money supply. 
Inflation "taxes" by removing buying power of those whose income and wealth do 
not keep pace with inflation. If pursued far enough, fmancing by printing of money 
brings capital flight, hyperinflation, disintegration of the formal economy, and social 
and political unrest. Large, often inequitable, income transfers occur. Creditors lose 
confidence in the system and refuse to lend. Saving is discouraged because buying 
power erodes with inflation. An advanced economy cannot function that way. The 
United States has not chosen to finance the deficit with an inflation "tax" but 
pressures exist to do so as debt mounts. 
2. Taxing. A spending increase fmanced concurrently by a tax increase does not create 
a deficit and will not stimulate the economy because it removes as much buying 
power as it adds to the economy .10 A joint spending and tax increase will raise the 
public share of the economy; it may or may not promote efficiency and equity. Many 
of the implications are similar to those for borrowing discussed below. 
3. Borrowing. The third means of fmancing is borrowing. The nation has chosen that 
path to finance its debt. The impact of borrowing to service expenditures depends 
partly on who holds debt. 
1<ln.e balanced budgetmultiplierofl.Ois a basic Keynesian concept. The multiplier implies that a $1 billion 
increase in taxes and expenditures will increase national income by $1 billion. The multiplier unrealistically 
assumes a perfectly elastic supply of output, no administrative cost, and no government waste or distortion of 
business incentives in collecting taxes and spending them. None of these assumptions hold; a simultaneous 
increase in taxes and expenditures may reduce real national income if resources are diverted from higher payoff 
private uses. 
14 
••••••••••••••• 
Who Holds Debt? 
Debt is held by foreign and domestic lenders, and by the public and private sectors. Of 
the $4.0 trillion federal debt in 1991, $2.6 trillion was held by the public, $1.1 trillion was 
held by federal trust funds, and the remaining $.3 trillion was held mainly by the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Table 3). The latter arises from a privilege of seignorage (ability to create 
money) and responsibility to control the money supply accorded the federal government. 
The Federal Reserve expands the money supply by buying debentures, thereby placing cash 
balances in the hands of debenture sellers who use them to purchase goods and services. 
The Federal Reserve has such operational needs whether or not the federal government 
runs deficits. 
Table 3. Private Holders of Public Debt, September 1991. 
Holder 
S and Ls, pension funds, credit unions, etc. 
State and local governments 
Foreign 
Individuals 
Commercial banks 
Insurance companies 
Corporations 
Money market funds 
Source: Council of Economic Adv1sors, p. 396. 
($ Billion) 
691 
520 
455 
264 
233 
169 
151 
80 
2,563 
Amount 
(Percent) 
27.0 
20.3 
17.7 
10.3 
9.1 
6.6 
5.9 
_2,1 
100.0 
Among trust funds, the largest projected federal holdings (borrowing) at the end of fiscal 
1993 are the federal old age and survivors insurance trust ($367 billion) and the federal 
employees civil service retirement and disability trust fund ($310 billion). Borrowing of the 
federal government from the Social Security surplus totals about $400 billion. 
The categories of private holders of the $2.6 trillion of publicly held debt are shown in 
Table 3. Those who lend to finance the national debt are more wealthy than the general 
population, but considerable numbers of persons in pension funds, credit unions, and the 
"individual" category in Table 3 are not wealthy. 
According to Table 3, foreigners held less than 20% of the public debt in 1991. At the 
margin they are more important than that. In a full employment economy, private 
investment tends to absorb all domestic private saving, hence the public debt needs to be 
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financed by foreigners (see Council of Economic Advisors, p. 328 for comparison of private 
saving and investment over time). 
Domestic creditors will tend to maintain aggregate demand by spending any reimbursed 
funds on domestic consumption or investment if the current borrow-and-spend policy 
changes. The same cannot be said for foreign holders of debt. They are more likely to 
spend abroad money no longer needed to fmance U.S. debt. The impact is to reduce 
aggregate U.S. demand. Paying off foreign debt requires export earnings and hence 
especially impacts traded good industries. Thus the domestic economy is affected differently 
by repaying foreign held debt than by repaying domestically held debt. 
The issue of who holds the federal debt sometimes causes confusion as apparent from the 
statement of economists Ross LaRoe and John Pool: 
The $4.2 trillion is the gross debt. To get the right number, you have to calculate the net 
debt. That means you have to subtract the amount of debt held by the Federal Reserve system 
and the Social Security trust funds. The Fed owns about $300 million, and the Social Security 
system owns $1 trillion [incorrect, as noted earlier], so the government essentially owes $1.3 
trillion to itself, leaving a net debt of only $2.9trillion, hardly enough to worry about [p. 2C]. 
One of the great fears of future Social Security recipients is that the multi-trillion dollar 
debt regarded cavalierly as "hardly enough to worry about" will cause the federal 
government to renege on repaying principal plus interest on its debt to trust funds. 
The debt the government seemingly owes itself is mostly owed to Social Security, federal 
employees, and other trusts that one day must be repaid mostly from income taxes. Hence 
debt owed by government to "itself" for the most part is no different than debt owed to the 
public . 
••••••••••••••• 
State of the Economy 
A deficit has a very different effect on a full-employment economy than on a less-than-
full-employment economy. The latter economy is characterized by idle industrial capacity, 
workers eager to but unable to fmd work, and by excess saving because savers hold income 
for a "rainy day" while investors are too pessimistic to spend for the long term. A deficit 
raises aggregate demand, puts plants and people to work, raises income, and creates a 
climate of optimism for the future. Inflation is modest because idle resources put to work 
do not bid up prices and costs. The normal relationship of saving to investment returns as 
the economy reaches full employment. 
Unfavorable consequences result from government deficits continued in a full-employment 
economy when private (individual and corporate) investment tends to utilize all private 
saving. A fundamental relationship governing trade is that net domestic private savings 
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(gross savings S less investment I) plus net domestic local, state, and federal government 
savings (revenue R minus expenditures E) equals net exports (exports X less imports M in 
the balance of payments). In other words, investment and government expenditures in 
excess of domestic savings and taxes must be financed by foreign capital inflow which is 
supplied dollars by a trade deficit. The formula and the numbers for 1980, 1982, and 1986 
are shown below: 
(S -I) + R-E + R-E - X-M 
(state, (federal) (exports 
local) less 
imports) 
($Billion) 
1980 32.5 24.8 -60.1 l.P 
(full empl., small def.) 
1982 114.1 26.9 -135.5 -5.9 
(recession) 
1986 4.2 54.3 -201.0 -145.4 
(full empl., large def.) 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, pp. 328,389,412. 
a Sums are not exact because of inventories of dollar reserves abroad, errors in data, time lags, etc. 
The years are selected to illustrate the impact of federal deficits on the balance of 
payments under various employment scenarios. The first scenario, 1980, shows a small 
federal deficit of $60 billion under full employment. A modest private (individual and 
corporate) surplus of saving over investment coupled with a small state and local 
government surplus offset the federal government deficit. The result, as predicted by the 
formula, was a balance of payments near zero. 
The second scenario, 1982, illustrates what happens to trade with a large federal deficit 
when the economy is in recession. When individuals and fmns save their income and fail 
to invest out of pessimism regarding the future, the result is excessive private saving relative 
to private investment. Supplemented by a modest state-local government surplus, the net 
saving fmanced the federal deficit of $135.5 billion in 1982 so that trade was almost in 
balance. The deficit was justified to offset what was saved and not invested, and hence to 
maintain aggregate demand and revive the economy. The deficit did not distort trade or 
require foreign fmancing. 
The third scenario, 1986, is for a full-employment federal deficit. In the full-employment 
economy nearly all private saving is utilized for private investment. The $54 billion state 
and local government surplus in 1986 was enough to fmance only part of the federal deficit. 
Most of the federal deficit had to be financed from abroad. Foreigners earned dollars to 
finance the deficit by running trade surpluses with us. That translated into a balance of 
payments deficit for the United States of $145 billion in 1986. 
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Some lessons follow: 
1. The trade deficit and budget deficit are "twins"in a full-employment economy but not 
in a recession. 
2. Federal deficits are appropriate in a recession to absorb the private saving surplus, 
maintain aggregate demand, and generate economic momentum. 
3. The federal budget needs to be in balance or surplus in a full-employment economy 
to avoid trade and other distortions, including accumulation of debt. In a full-
employment economy open to trade and investment, deficits raise real interest rates, 
the value of the dollar, and imports -- all harmful to agriculture as a net debtor and 
exporter. Agriculture is especially interest sensitive because it uses more capital per 
worker than other industries on average. In a closed full-employment economy, 
federal deficits raise interest rates even more because relatively elastic foreign 
supplies of financial capital are unavailable. 
4. Larger net private savings (S-I) help to offset government dissavings (negative R-E), 
resulting in greater net exports. The U.S. consumer savings rate of 4% in 1993 
compared unfavorably with the Japanese rate of 18%; the German rate of 15%; and 
the British, French, and Canadian rate of 12% (The Outlook, p. A1). These other 
industrial countries can have relatively large government deficits without becoming 
net importers. 
The above example shows only what is happening to the U.S. balance of payments flow 
of goods and services. That net flow mirrors opposing capital flows. In fact, the complete 
balance of payments account always sums to zero because any shortfall in goods and services 
shown in the right hand column of the above text table is always offset by an equal inflow 
of capital. 
Current account deficits represent claims of foreigners on the United States. Data on 
financial claims of Americans on foreigners and of foreigners on Americans are inexact 
because of problems in valuing property. At estimated market value, the net annual foreign 
investment position of the U.S. went from $268 billion in 1983 to -$382 billion in 1991, a 
total deterioration of $650 billion. The nation has gone from being the world's largest 
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creditor to having fewer assets abroad than foreigners have in the U.S. 11 As net foreign 
debt accumulates, a nation increasingly sacrifices its domestic macroeconomic policy and 
foreign policy to foreign private creditors and governments. 
Receipts from earnings on U.S.-owned assets abroad exceeded net payments to foreigners 
for earnings on their assets in the U.S. by only $16 billion in 1991. Thus foreigners earn 
about as much on their assets in the U.S. as our assets earn abroad. If rates of return are 
about equal, the current small net earnings suggest that U.S. assets abroad about equal debts 
(see footnote 11). If the 1983-91 trend continues, however, foreigners will have far larger 
investment and earnings in the U.S. than the U.S. has abroad. This is not necessarily 
because private capital is more productive in the U.S.-- and hence an attraction to foreign 
investors. Foreign capital inflows have been motivated by higher returns resulting from the 
low supply of savings relative to demand for savings to finance the government deficit . 
••••••••••••••• 
Open Versus Closed Economy 
to Trade and Investment 
The foregoing analysis assumed an economy open to foreign trade and capital flows. 
Imagine the impact of a large federal deficit in a closed full employment economy. Because 
private investment typically utilizes virtually all individual and corporate saving in a full 
employment economy, the deficit would have to be financed out of domestic savings in a 
closed economy. 
Competition for limited domestic savings between domestic investors and government 
would drive up interest rates, encouraging some additional private saving but mostly 
crowding out private investment. The result would be a severe setback to interest-sensitive 
sectors of the economy such as automobiles, housing, and agriculture. These setbacks might 
be offset by increased spending elsewhere. However, the high interest rates would crowd 
11 At market value, the U.S. investment position was as follows in 1983 and 1991 (Council of Economic 
Advisors, 1993,p. 461): 
U.S. assets abroad 
Foreign assets in U.S. 
U.S. net international investment position 
1983 
1,068.3 
800.7 
267.6 
($Billion) 
1991 
2,107.0 
2,488.9 
-381.9 
The $650billion net deterioration of the U.S. position from 1983 to 1991is a serious concern. It is widely stated 
that the nation has become the world's largest net debtor since 1983. If the U.S. is not the world's largest 
debtor, it may soon achieve that dubious distinction. Ordinarily, a capital rich country would be a net creditor 
to the rest of the world. 
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out private investment, slow real economic growth, and might create unemployment. The 
nation would have had difficulty pursuing its full employment deficit policy of the 1980s 
without the relatively recent creation of efficient international fmancial capital markets. 
In summary, the economy may continue to experience full employment with deficit 
spending but future economic growth is retarded because government-led consumption is 
replacing private capital formation. The added cost of interest payments makes 
macroeconomic reform at once more burdensome and more needed. Sustained government 
deficits are politically unappealing in a closed economy because they sharply raise interest 
rates, crowd out private investment, and create heavy pressure to print money and cause 
inflation. Open economies drawing on the relatively new and efficient international capital 
market can avoid many of the politically unfavorable short-term impacts of full employment 
budget deficits. Flexible exchange rates and efficient world financial capital markets have 
lessened macroeconomic policy discipline . 
••••••••••••••• 
The Fiscal Policy Cycle 
The nation cannot continue to live beyond its means, consuming more than it produces, 
importing more than it exports, and borrowing more than it lends. Deficits, trade balances, 
and borrowing rates of the past decade are unsustainable. 
Reaganomics has two phases: the expansionary phase described above by a nation living 
beyond its means is followed by a stabilization phase characterized by production exceeding 
consumption, exports exceeding imports, and capital outflows exceeding inflows. In the U.S., 
some aspects of the turnaround to the stabilization phase are already apparent such as lower 
interest rates, lower dollar, and lower trade deficit. Some of that turnaround was caused 
by the 1990-91 recession resulting in part by an attempt to restore fiscal responsibility 
through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. The full turnaround to the 
stabilization phase has not yet occurred --unsustainable budget and trade deficits continue. 
An important point is that consumers were better off in the expansionary phase of 
Reaganomics and traded goods industries such as agriculture were worse off. As the nation 
moves into the stabilization phase, consumers will be worse off and traded goods sectors 
such as agriculture will be relatively better off. 12 The low dollar will be saying that a trade 
surplus resulting from decreased imports and increased exports is necessary to service debt 
and pay for imports. 
12In other ways agriculture may be worse off with stabilization. Commodity programs are tempting targets 
for balancing the federal budget in the austerity of the stabilization phase. Furthermore, the stabilization phase 
featuring lower interest and exchange rates is accompanied by recession "exported" to the rest of the world 
because we buy less abroad. The recession abroad can offset U.S. farm export gains from the lower dollar. 
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The cycle of expansion and stabilization phases under Reaganomics does not mean that 
agriculture and the economy as a whole average out to as favorable a situation as with a 
sound macroeconomic policy for steady, sustainable economic growth. For example, farmers 
lost in the financial crisis of the early 1980s caused by high interest and exchange rates and 
low exports are not retrieved or compensated in the stabilization phase. The trauma of 
instability plagues the entire economy, causing wrenching adjustments as sectors expand and 
contract. A dynamic growing economy continually renews itself by shedding the inefficient 
while efficient firms emerge with new technology, management, and products meeting new 
demands. That healthy renewal process has nothing in common with the fiscal cycle 
featuring change for the sake of change under unsustainable, binge macroeconomic policies. 
Reaganomics is a somewhat mild manifestation of what I have referred to elsewhere 
(Tweeten, December 1989) as the Economic Degradation Process or EDP. The EDP is 
caused by macroeconomic policies of a country attempting to live beyond its means. Typical 
steps are as follows: 
1. Large government current account deficits (and/or capital account deficits for low-
payoff investments). 
2. Increased taxes to cover deficits, often causing serious economic distortions either 
because of reduced incentives to produce or costly machinations to circumvent taxes. 
3. Borrowing because taxes are insufficient. Borrowing usually begins in the domestic 
economy but extends internationally as local sources prove inadequate or too 
damaging to domestic demand. 
4. Printing of money when neither taxing nor borrowing can meet the perceived need 
to consume. 
5. Overvalued currency in foreign exchange because governments are reluctant to 
devalue currency --a politically unpopular measure imposing burdens on well-to-do, 
politically influential urban consumers of imports whose prices would be inflated. 
Countries defend their overvalued currency in the name of national pride and 
prestige. 
6. Shortage of foreign exchange as imports continue to exceed exports. The result may 
be a run on the currency, fmancial crisis, and shortages of critical imports such as 
petroleum and spare parts. 
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The EDP is a macroeconomic policy failure, but it tends to create failures of other types. 
It encourages trade distortions of all types designed to raise exports and reduce imports. 13 
It creates flight of sorely needed domestic capital because nationals fear loss of buying 
power with inflation and devaluation. It creates instabilities and uncertainties that are the 
enemy of investment, capital formation, and economic growth. In the stabilization phase, 
an undervalued currency attracts foreign investment. However, residents may view purchase 
by foreigners of domestic farm and other real estate as a threat to national sovereignty . 
••••••••••••••• 
Length of Run 
The impact of budget deficits and debt varies with length of run. Economic growth 
depends on how well resources are allocated, including allocation of income to current 
consumption versus saving to invest in capital generating future income. 
As noted earlier, personal saving rates of Americans rank near the lowest among 
industrialized nations. Government budget deficits add to the problem of low national 
saving because they are negative saving offsetting foregone consumption (saving) of 
individuals and corporations. In national income and product accounting, deficits are 
treated much like investments but are not investment because they are used mostly to 
finance current consumption. The borrowing to fmance federal deficits diverts private funds 
to current consumption by government; part of those funds would have been invested in 
private capital to generate future income streams. 
In early years of deficits, those (many of them wealthy) who fmance the federal debt 
forego consumption and lend their income to government which uses the money to pay for 
its activities. If the proportions saved and consumed were the same for government and 
creditors and if each consumed and invested with equal efficiency, the economy would be 
the same size and would grow at the same rate over time as with no deficit. The Ricardian-
Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) holds that taxpayers and/or public service recipients who 
could benefit from additional consumption made possible by deficits actually maintain a 
"permanent consumption stream." They do so by saving income in the expansionary phase 
of Reaganomics to invest and later spend in the stabilization phase when their taxes will be 
raised and government benefits curtailed to pay for the first phase. REH holds that 
creditors and program beneficiaries use borrowing and lending to maintain their 
consumption stream on a fixed trajectory over time. 
13 An example may be trade sanctions imposed on Japan for alleged trade barriers ca~sing the large trade 
deficit with the U.S. However, most of the deficit is from the high savings rate in Japan and the low savings rate 
and large federal government budget deficit in the U.S. The result could be a trade war threatening our largest 
farm export market. 
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REH is not supported on conceptual and empirical grounds. It implies a degree of 
knowledge and economic sophistication few Americans possess. The declining gross private 
saving rate in the mid-1980s compared to earlier years provides no evidence for REH 
(Council of Economic Advisors, p. 238). 
A more plausible conclusion is that in early years creditors forego consumption and some 
private investment to lend to government; in later years creditors consume more as their 
income is enhanced by interest and principal repayments. Persons whose taxes are 
postponed or whose government program benefits are enhanced increase their consumption 
in the deficit or expansionary phase and curtail consumption in the stabilization phase. The 
temporal impact is to transfer consumption to the current from the future generation of 
taxpayers-government service utilizers and to transfer some consumption to the future from 
the current generation of lenders. Effects on lenders are not large because they have 
alternative outlets for funds in all phases of the fiscal cycle. 
Some contend that consumption by the current generation is more important than 
consumption by the next generation because any bias toward the current generation is at 
least offset by technological progress allowing the next generation to live better than the 
preceding generation. Budget deficits help to redress that intertemporal inequity. A 
counterargument is that irresponsible flScal policy will diminish chances for succeeding 
generations to live better. For the most part, government failure is more frequent than 
market failure. Government probably has a lower propensity to invest well than does the 
private sector, hence beyond some point diversion of funds from the private to the public 
sector reduces national income. A smaller government budget used cost-effectively could 
meet all needs for the government to supply public goods such as environmental protection, 
schooling, basic research, and infrastructure as well as supply health and welfare benefits 
for those unable to provide for themselves. Any increase in government spending above this 
level reduces real national income . 
••••••••••••••• 
Concluding Comments 
With the many consumption and investment opportunities available to them, lenders 
would probably do about as well in the short and long run without government deficits to 
finance. Consequently, the principal impact of deficits is to transfer income to current 
taxpayers and government service recipients from future taxpayers and service recipients. 
Most economists contend there is no reason to favor current government benefit 
recipients and taxpayers over future recipients and taxpayers, hence full-employment current 
account deficits make no sense. The issue is more than one of intergenerational equity, 
however, and also touches on efficiency and stability (or sustainability). Deficits increase 
demand relative to supply of saving, raising real interest rates in the long and short run. 
The impact is inequitable in raising income of creditors relative to poorer taxpayer and 
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government service recipients, and is inefficient because investment and income growth is 
slowed. 
Unsustainably large deficits cause the deficit cycle of expansion and stabilization explained 
earlier, creating instability that is a hardship to a risk-averse population. Even if the income 
averages out over the fiscal cycle, the dislocation of people and firms between the expansion 
and stabilization phases is traumatic to many. Full-employment deficits remove fiscal policy 
as a tool to lift the nation out of recession. Long-term economic growth is determined by 
wise investments in human, material, and technological capital (that determine productivity). 
Deficits waste resources by funneling an undue portion of GDP through the public sector 
which has a poor overall record of investment choices and efficiency. We do not have 
reliable empirical measures of the impact of full employment deficits on long-term economic 
growth, however . 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL DEFICITS 
AND DEBT ON AGRICULTURE? 
The foregoing discussion indicating that full-employment federal deficits contribute to 
economic instability, dislocations, slow growth, and transfers from future to present taxpayers 
and government benefit recipients applies to the overall economy. Impacts on agriculture 
are noted briefly below. 
In earlier decades agriculture was heavily influenced by national business conditions 
through aggregate domestic demand originating from income and employment. Now 
agriculture is more influenced by changes in interest, foreign exchange, and inflation rates 
caused by policy-induced macroeconomic cycles. Cash-flow, real wealth, cost-price squeeze, 
and instability impacts of unsound monetary and fiscal policies are discussed in detail 
elsewhere (Tweeten, 1989, Ch. 6) and are treated only briefly here. 
Deficits cause high real interest and exchange rates which hurt agriculture in the 
expansion phase but lower rates help agriculture in the stabilization phase of the fiscal cycle. 
Although the cost-price squeeze in the expansionary phase may be offset in the stabilization 
phase, the instability and dislocations caused by binge macroeconomics damage the farm 
economy. High real interest rates and less exports in the expansionary phase caused massive 
real wealth losses to agriculture from 1982 to 1986. 
Problems encountered in financing federal debt out of taxes and borrowing could bring 
intense pressure to create money. The resulting inflation could make investment in real 
assets such as farmland more attractive, but would generate a cash-flow squeeze because 
inflation raises immediate costs and defers returns which come as capital gains to land 
owners. Higher land prices would restrict entry of young operators. 
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Fiscal excesses of the 1980s removed fiscal policy as a tool to quickly end the 1990-91 
recession. This hurt farmers depending on off-farm jobs. The prolonged U.S. downturn was 
exported to the rest of the world, thereby reducing demand for U.S. farm exports. The 
cycles of unsound monetary and fiscal policies created uncertainty aggravating nature's 
shocks such as droughts difficult enough alone for agriculture to bear. 
The effort to reduce the federal debt in 1990 is another example of a man-made shock 
to agriculture. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 adjusted the 1990 farm bill 
to create the 15% flexible base, trimming federal program benefits for agriculture 
accordingly. Real loan rates on wheat and com fell 55% and real target prices fell 35% 
from 1983 to 1993. Whatever the economic merits or demerits of farm support levels, 
budget stringency was a proximate cause of their decline. 
Full-employment federal deficits financed by borrowing rather than printing of money 
avoids inflation. But borrowing like printing of money distorts the economy. Many 
distortions hurt agriculture directly in the short run as noted above. In the long run, 
distortions slow national economic growth. Because per capita income of farmers is 
ultimately determined by per capita income of nonfarmers, it follows that macroeconomic 
policies that diminish the nonfarm economy ultimately reduce real earnings of farm people . 
••••••••••••••••••••••• 
WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO DEBT? 
The numerous past efforts at responsible fiscal policy have all failed. If President 
Clinton's effort also fails, it is well to consider what might ultimately restrain fiscal policy. 
What limits debt in a world where countries formally do not go bankrupt? At the 
extreme, an economy can no longer function when interest on the debt equals the gross 
domestic product (GDP). Nominal GDP increased 5.0% per year while nominal debt 
increased 13.3% per year from 1980 to 1991. If the interest rate is 7%, interest on the debt 
will equal the entire GDP in only 41 years at these rates of accumulation! Years required 
for interest to exhaust GDP are shown for other scenarios in Table 4. Only cases where the 
debt growth rate exceeds GNP growth rate have limits. Note that the 1980-91 experience 
where the rate of gain in debt exceeded that in GDP by 13-5 =7 percentage points gives 
solutions similar to those in the table where debt growth also exceeds GDP growth by 7 
percentage points. 
Table 4 shows upper limits; other forces will slow debt growth much sooner. A country 
is technically bankrupt when efforts to reduce the deficit slow aggregate demand and the 
economy enough to actually increase the deficit. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 contributed to recession in late -1990 and 1991 but only because the economy had 
been seriously weakened by excessive private and public debt. Continued large federal 
deficits could lead to a situation where lower deficits would send even a normal economy 
into recession. 
25 
Table 4. Years Required for Interest on Federal Debt to Equal GDP. 
Nominal GDP Growth Interest Rate (%) 
Rate(%) 5.0 7.0 9.0 
Deficit Accumulation Rate (7%/yr.) 
3.0 87 78 72 
5.0 176 158 144 
Deficit Accumulation Rate (9%/yr.) 
3.0 58 53 48 
5.0 89 80 73 
7.0 179 161 147 
Deficit Accumulation Rate (11%/yr.) 
3.0 44 40 36 
5.0 60 54 49 
7.0 90 81 74 
Numerous third-world countries in Latin America and Africa became technically bankrupt 
in the 1980s. Foreign debt service requirements were so large they could not import capital 
and technology essential to maintain national output. Debt subsequently was forgiven or 
restructured in many cases; still the result was a decade of foregone economic growth. 
Although we do not know the critical debt-GDP ratios and foreign debt service-export ratios 
above which a nation becomes technically bankrupt, we do know that nations with high 
ratios have not honored their commitments to creditors. 14 Among such nations, money 
creation (inflation) has been their domestic policy of choice to reduce the burden of debt. 
Creditors and others whose asset values and income do not keep pace with inflation thus 
are "taxed." Monetizing may reduce the burden of domestic debt but does not absolve 
responsibility for foreign debt payable in hard currencies. Governments printing money to 
service debt destroy fmancial assets of their citizens, lose credibility, create social unrest and 
political instability, and must pay higher interest on future credit to compensate for risk and 
loss of trust. 
When a small country defaults, the world financial system is not threatened. If the United 
States were to default, the world fmancial community would face severe crisis if not collapse. 
14U.S. federal debt was 70% of GDP in 1991. Ratios above 100% become especially troublesome. 
Some cite the much higher ratio of public debt to GNP after WWII than today as evidence our debt 
burden is not serious. The comparison is not relevant, however. First, combined public and private debt were 
not high (see Figure 2). Second, after the war we were the dominant economy facing a world of growing 
demand and little competition. The situation is entirely different today. 
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The most likely crisis bringing Americans to realize the seriousness of the federal debt 
would be a run on the dollar as sellers dump dollars in favor of other foreign currencies. 
The dollar would fall sharply as the nation would exhaust its foreign exchange reserves. 
The collapse of the dollar would be more than a short-term crisis. The most serious long-
term consequence would be for the world to shift from dollars to the yen and mark as its 
reserve currencies. America would lose benefits of seigniorage it has enjoyed so long --
receiving goods and services imports in exchange for dollars which exporters use as currency 
rather than claims on our scarce resources to supply them goods and services. Oil prices 
could be denominated in more reliable currencies. With the dollar no longer an 
international currency and oil prices not again set in dollars, American inflation no longer 
would reduce our real cost of oil imports. 
Commercial trade and debt service denominated in our own currency gives the United 
States a great advantage over other nations incurring debt. If domestic prices inflate 100% 
and the dollar value is halved in international exchange, the United States can pay off its 
foreign debts with half as many resources as before. That makes inflation and devaluation 
manageable if not downright attractive. If the dollar is no longer the world's currency, our 
debts will be denominated in more stable currencies and will have to be serviced at full 
resource value. 
A falling value of the dollar raises our import costs and reduces our living standards. 
Devoting a significant portion of our exports to service foreign debt would leave less export 
earnings to purchase foreign goods and services for maintaining living standards. The 
nation's superpower role in providing foreign aid and security would be threatened. 
Attracted by a cheap dollar, foreigners would buy up a rising share of the nation's farm and 
other real estate. Our domestic macroeconomic policies would be subject to foreign 
scrutiny. Our policies would need to be designed to retain confidence of foreign investors 
in the U.S. Protectionist elements would gain new prominence. Trade wars and other 
disruptions of world commerce could be commonplace. 
In short, the limits to debt cannot be predicted with precision but the consequences of 
approaching them are devastating. A wise policy is to begin immediately to restore fiscal 
integrity. To avoid shocks that could increase the deficit by causing recession, deficits need 
to be reduced gradually over a 5-year period or longer . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
WHATMUST BE DONE 
TO RESTORE FISCAL RESPONSffiiLITY? 
Sound macroeconomic policy is straightforward. In monetary policy, it means expanding 
the money supply at essentially the rate of full-employment real output growth 
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approximately 2.5% annually in the United States. 15 In fiscal policy it means running a 
current account in balance or surplus, and incurring deficits only in recession. The broad 
guidelines are simple; achieving them is difficult indeed. This section lists suggestions for 
institutional reform needed to implement sound policy. 
The inability of government to control debt since 1980 has numerous explanations. One 
is that the current generation is a special interest group. Some contend the problem is 
uninformed voters and the political rise of the "instant gratification" generation of baby 
boomers. Like a family, a nation can borrow and spend as if there is no tomorrow until 
credit worthiness and borrowing capacity are gone. Latin American strongmen have been 
doing this for decades. Perhaps it is surprising that the American government was so slow 
to discover it. More plausible explanations than free-spending baby-boomer voters are 
offered below. 
A government in a closed economy can live beyond its means but its ability to finance 
deficits is limited by domestic saving. A closed economy cannot in aggregate live beyond 
its means because every dollar borrowed and spent by government must be offset by another 
dollar saved and not spent by creditors. Only an economy open to foreign trade and 
international capital flows can live beyond its means for extended periods. It is no 
coincidence that Reaganomics coincided with the internationalization of the capital market. 
Of course, President Reagan's strong leadership and affinity to the discredited Laffer Curve 
also contributed. Divided government --a Democratic Congress and Republican President 
--made matters worse by reducing accountability. Each side could blame the other. 
The foregoing sections provided some insights into restoring fiscal responsibility. First, 
the problem is not lack of knowledge: The prescription for sound fiscal policy is straight-
forward. Second, the magnitude of the federal deficit is elusive but estimates need not be 
exact to improve policy. Third, the economic shock of reducing the deficit is not over-
whelming: A borrow-and-spend policy takes about as much out of the economy as it puts 
in whether the debt is rising or falling. Fourth, the issue is not our low propensity to save: 
A country with low savings does not have to live beyond its means although it is tempted 
to do so because low savings contribute to low investment and slow economic growth. Fifth, 
the issue is not claims on federal largess: Interest groups always have and always will ask; 
the key to successful policy is a government that can say no. The following paragraphs 
especially address the issue of why the federal government has been unable to say no to 
claims on its generosity and what institutional changes are necessary for it to say no. 
15Some studies indicate that a 2-3% inflation rate aids the economy by creating price and wage flexibility. 
Hence, annual money supply increasing at 5% is acceptable. 
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••••••••••••••• 
Past Institutional Reform 
Legislation has been easier to enact than to apply with success to bridle government 
deficits. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was an early 
attempt at budget responsibility by Congress. The Act established procedures to set overall 
receipts, expenditures, and division of outlays in a Concurrent Budget Resolution to be 
passed by Congress early in the year (May 15). Proposed legislation from committees and 
subcommittees were to conform to the guidelines. The Act instituted a more rational 
budget process than the previous piecemeal approach but did not bring fiscal responsibility 
to Congress. One reason is because it cost the President a form of the line item veto --the 
ability to impound (not spend) funds authorized by law to be spent. 
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH), officially the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, called for a balanced budget by FY 1993. GRH was replaced 
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) adopted in late 1990 after a budget 
summit between the Administration and Congressional leaders. OBRA was designed to 
reduce 1991-95 deficits by nearly $500 billion. 
A notable section of OBRA, the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), established procedures 
to discipline government fiscal policy so as to balance the federal budget in five years. One 
provision of BEA set discretionary spending caps on (1) defense, (2) international, and (3) 
domestic programs from 1991 through 1993. Each of the three categories has a cap and a 
"frrewall" to prevent the government from using savings from one category (e.g. defense) to 
compensate for new spending on another category. By 1994 and 1995, the three categories 
were to be allowed to compete for combined spending under a single dollar ceiling below 
that in 1993. 
A second provision, a pay-as-you-go rule, specified that, in aggregate, mandatory spending 
such as Medicare and unemployment compensation not add to the deficit. Any change in 
provisions raising expenditures would have to be accompanied by a tax increase. 
With few exceptions such as declared emergencies for the Los Angeles riot, Chicago flood, 
and Florida hurricane, the government adhered to OBRA. Large budget deficits persist 
mainly because planners anticipated neither the 1990 recession which reduced government 
revenue nor the massive increases in outlays for Medicare and Medicaid health programs. 
President Clinton's economic program replaces OBRA and also is designed to reduce the 
deficit to sustainable levels. But it is as much a major reordering of tax and spending 
priorities as an effort at fiscal restraint. The ambitious social agenda pursued by the 
Administration could enlarge deficits by 1996 and beyond. The string of failed legislative 
efforts at fiscal responsibility are manifestations of fundamental, systemic root causes 
underlying the nation's commitment to live beyond its means. 
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••••••••••••••• 
Decline of Encompassing 
Institutions 
The loss of federal fiscal control is explained mainly by the decline of encompassing 
institutions. The major encompassing institutions are the Presidency, political parties, and 
congressional leadership including committee chairpersons. 16 Encompassing institutions 
tend to view legislation from the perspective of the long term and the nation at large -- the 
public interest. Other institutions view legislation from the standpoint of the short term and 
special interests -- the local district of a Congressman, the political action committee (PAC) 
which supplies funds for a specific group and purpose, or any other special interest which 
provides benefits to the decision maker. Encompassing institutions are accountable to the 
public at large and are responsive to nationwide popular opinion. Encompassing institutions 
are part of the representative political process, filtering populism through in-depth analysis 
so as to anticipate and avoid undesirable (1) unintended consequences, (2) interactions, (3) 
long-term impacts, and (4) macro-micro inconsistencies. 
Any well-functioning democracy must maintain a balance between encompassing 
institutions concerned about the nation's welfare and nonencompassing institutions ensuring 
that legislation is tailored to legitimate local needs and circumstances. Excessive dominance 
by encompassing interests is manifest in overlooked local needs and injustices to small 
groups. When nonencompassing institutions predominate, the fallacy of composition or 
micro-macro inconsistency dominates. That is, legislation responding favorably to each 
special interest group separately is damaging to the public interest and to long-term well-
being of the nation. 
The most serious institutional failure is the decline of the political party. The party, an 
inherently encompassing institution, had long-term perspective and had a major stake in a 
candidate whose good governance would build a favorable nationwide party image so that 
the party could prosper and place more persons in office in the long run. Parties dominated 
the nomination process and supplied campaign funds to candidates. Local party organizers 
assured an audience on the campaign circuit. But interest group funding has replaced party 
funding, television has replaced the local party organizer, and conventional delegates bound 
to local-issue primary election results have replaced party professionals. Who will screen 
out a candidate willing to sacrifice the distant interests of children and grandchildren to 
finance generous programs for today? 
The presidency remains the most powerful of encompassing institutions among elected 
offices but has lost some of its force to serve the public interest even as it has gained overall 
power by virtue of technocratic expertise in the executive branch. The reasons for the 
decline are many. In former times, the President was nominated by and his campaign was 
1~uch of this section is from Tweeten (1989, ch. 3). 
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financed by the party. He could not campaign everywhere and so had to depend on the 
party faithful to work for him in every section of the country. Now, television reaches every 
section of the country, reducing the need for local organization. Celebrity status and 
telegenic personality rank well above party loyalty or statesmanship as qualifications for a 
successful candidate. 
The President can take office obligated to no one with the long-term public interest at 
heart. Thus, the President's policies tend to reflect the special interests which got him 
elected and his own short-run perspective --at most eight years rather than the indefinitely 
long horizon of the party. He can pursue a profligate fiscal policy of the nation living 
beyond its means until credit runs out (after he leaves office), leaving a burdensome legacy 
of debt for future generations. 
The situation in Congress is similar except that Congress is inherently nonencompassing. 
That is, it makes sense for a congressman to aggrandize his constituency knowing that his 
district will pay only 11435 = .2 percent of the cost (assuming his district is of average size 
and wealth). Incentives facing a Senator are only slightly more in the public interest. 
In former times, party discipline helped to ensure that private greed did not bring national 
fiscal ruin for which the party and its congressional leadership would be held accountable. 
But Congress today is all but unable to serve the long-term public interest or even legitimate 
private interests in the face of the rise of single issue interests and television, with decline 
in the power of congressional leadership, with a sharp rise in congressional staff numbers 
(good contacts for ubiquitous lobbyists), and with proliferation of subcommittees easily 
commandeered by special interests who are likely to find members of Congress responsive 
to their causes. 
Fiscal responsibility can be restored by shifting the balance of political power towards 
encompassing institutions. Some suggestions include: 
1. Greater funding of elections by the public rather than by special interest groups, and 
a greater portion of funds provided to parties which in tum will allocate funds to 
candidates. Free media, especially in-depth television coverage on substantive issues, 
can help. Changes in election laws could go farther to lower political contributions 
to individual candidates relative to contributions to parties. Contributions to 
individual campaigns but not to parties would be limited. Many of President 
Clinton's reforms proposed in 1993 make sense but numerous other, more important 
changes are necessary as noted below. 
2. Strengthen professional expertise of staffs of the Congressional Budget Office, 
General Accounting Office, Office of Technology Assessment, Library of Congress 
(Legislative Reference Service), and congressional committees. However, a danger 
is that these agencies will serve parochial interests favored by Congress. Because 
technocratic expertise is a major source of power, the encompassing executive branch 
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of government must have the greatest expertise to analyze and help manage 
programs. 
3. Tighten party discipline and leadership influence in Congress. Sharply reduce the 
number of subcommittees. 
4. Use term limits to reduce opportunities for pork barrel and privilege attending 
seniority, and to reduce incentives for trading special favors for a campaign "war 
chest." Incumbency has become America's hereditary aristocracy as seniority-laden 
members of Congress return term after term to reward the special interests and 
constituents who got them reelected. Members of Congress get reelected by 
channeling pork barrel projects to their districts rather than by serving the broad 
public interest. This phenomenon is manifest in polls showing that constituents 
strongly support their representatives but strongly criticize Congress as a group. 
5. Divide states into four groups at random and hold primary elections in each group 
one month apart. The intent would be to have each grouping represent a cross 
section of interests so that a candidate would have to appeal to broad interests rather 
than to special interests to obtain the nomination. 
6. Carefully scrutinize so called off-budget items; where appropriate place them within 
the federal budget. 
7. Provide the President the line-item veto. 
8. Amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget. A 60% majority would be 
required for legislation to run deficits above those arising from automatic stabilizers 
during recession. More than a simple majority is called for to overcome the past bias 
toward government failure apparent in persistent deficits. 
A balanced budget amendment is a drastic response indeed to fiscal irresponsibility in 
government. 17 Cluttering the constitution with an essentially procedural matter is a 
deplorable way to restore fiscal discipline to government. Nothing else has worked, 
however. 
17In 1992, the House failed by only 9 votes from approving a balanced budget amendment by the necessary 
two-thirds majority. Had the amendment been successful in the House and Senate and signed by the President, 
it would have required a balanced budget two years after being ratified by three-fourths of the states. The 
amendment did not specify what steps must be taken to move toward a balanced budget. It did allow for budget 
deficits approved by 60% of the members of Congress, a useful safeguard to be able to use fiscal policy in 
recessions. 
32 
Some contend a solution is to divide the government budget into current and capital 
accounts. That solution has fatal drawbacks. 18 Creation of a separate capital account for 
deficit spending (while the current account is balanced) would create an attractive nuisance 
inviting abuse. All manner of spending would be classified as an investment in the future 
and thrown into a capital account always in deficit. In the United States, capital investments 
are so numerous that outlays for them and receipts from them pretty well balance from year 
to year. The law of large numbers allows capital investments made by the federal 
government to be on a pay-as-you-go basis in the current account. 19 
Some populists contend that the answer is for the government to simply repudiate its debt. 
Many such advocates believe creditors serve no useful purpose. Creditors forego 
consumption and alternative investments to finance public debt and hence deserve 
compensation. Repudiating debt or inflating it away by creating money would destroy 
confidence in government and would threaten existence of the world fmancial community. 
It is an unthinkable option . 
•••••••••••• 
CONCLUSIONS 
This report emphasizes reforms necessary for the government to say no to deficit 
spending. This focus on government rather than the economy as the source of the problem 
contrasts with claims by other economists that the problem is inadequate savings, trade 
barriers by Japan and other countries, too little taxation, or too much spending. 
This report could have but did not focus on specific tax and spending changes. For 
example, introducing a value added tax, reducing payroll taxes, and removing the corporate 
income tax could encourage saving and investment; indexing capital gains, limiting home 
mortgage income tax deductions, and extending the school year to 10 months could raise 
investments in human and material productive capital. Raising gasoline taxes by at least 50 
cents per gallon could reduce traffic congestion and dependence on foreign oil while 
encouraging energy efficiency and protection of the environment. Expanded apprenticeship 
programs, a wage supplement, or enlarged earned income credit could help disadvantaged 
workers escape poverty. All retirement programs (including Social Security) could be 
converted to actuarially sound vested investment plans to increase savings. The list could 
go on but is controversial and hence would require years to pass and implement. Thus the 
focus must first be on fiscal responsibility. 
18Tbe government has a pernicious tendency to underestimate the full-employment rate and hence to incur 
deficits even in a full-employment economy. 
19If the defense buildup of the Reagan years was in fact a capital outlay bringing lower defense costs with 
the end of the Cold War, the federal budget now should be in surplus to pay off that capital investment. 
Additional capital spending then could be justified to offset the dividend surplus. Such sophistry would constitute 
an endless debate. The better option is to require a balanced budget. 
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The adjustment to a sound economy will be difficult but not impossible. The reason is 
because the deficit is mostly a transfer payment. Increased government spending and 
reduced taxes have been financed by borrowing. Every dollar added to the economy 
through government deficit spending has been offset by a dollar removed from creditors' 
spending for consumption or investment. Similarly, one less dollar of government deficit 
spending will leave another dollar in the hands of creditors to spend on consumption or 
investment. Hence presence or absence of deficits kept within reasonable bounds and 
financed by borrowing does not have a decisive influence on aggregate demand. Foreign-
held debt behaves differently because repayments are less likely to be spent in the U.S. and 
hence to sustain aggregate demand. 
The principal cause of federal fiscal incontinence has been the decline of encompassing 
institutions such as political parties. To restore discipline, these institutions must be 
strengthened. 
• •••••••••• 
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